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Abstract: Anticipating that the problem of diagnostic 
errors will not easily be solved through education, debias-
ing techniques or incentives-based systems, experts have 
proposed the systematic use of decision support tools (or 
decision aids) in medical practice. These tools are active 
knowledge resources that use patient data to generate 
case-specific advice to support clinical decision making. 
We argue that designing these decision support tools 
incorporates both discrete, analytical information as well 
as intuitive elements that would optimize their impact 
on clinical everyday activities. The use of fuzzy cognitive 
maps should allow developers to achieve this aim, by 
incorporating published evidence, intuition and qualita-
tive assessment in a low-cost software program that could 
be implemented in various clinical settings.
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Problems in diagnostic decision
The diagnostic process is one of the main focuses of 
medical decision making. Indeed, establishing a diagno-
sis is a complex task: A physician is expected to act as an 
information processor, able to both collect information 
and process it efficiently to produce hypothesis about the 
clinical case and further examinations needed to evaluate 
them. We could describe the diagnostic process using a 
simple scheme (see Figure 1).
Substantial research has been devoted to this impor-
tant topic, but relatively little is known about the exact 
mechanisms of the diagnostic process, both when it suc-
ceeds or fails. Indeed, diagnostic errors account for a sub-
stantial number of all medical errors and even though it 
has recently received increasing attention [2, 3] it remains 
an important patient safety concern [4, 5].
Given the complexity of the diagnostic process, 
experts have proposed that the systematic use of decision 
support tools (or decision aids) in everyday clinical prac-
tice could improve diagnostic reliability and reduce the 
likelihood of error.
A decision support system (DSS) is an active knowl-
edge resource that uses patient data to generate case-spe-
cific advice, which supports decision making by health 
professionals, the patients themselves or others con-
cerned about them [6].
A cognitive balanced model (CBM)
Several authors have described how experts typically 
employ subconscious, intuitive, synthetic thinking 
(System 1, S1) [7, 8]. In contrast, others have argued 
that physicians should adopt exclusively analytical 
approaches to problem-solving, which would be less 
prone to intuitive bias and emotional contamination. In 
this case, a good doctor would be a pure rational decision 
maker, able to follow precisely step-by-step algorithms. 
If errors should arise in this setting, it would indicate the 
intrusion of heuristics and/or wrong procedures due to a 
poor professional training, or to contingencies, such as 
a negative mood, excessive stress, or distractions like a 
noisy environment. Most DSSs are based on the idea that 
physicians need help in enhancing their analytical think-
ing, encouraging users to abandon intuition in favor of 
procedural reasoning. Unfortunately, this conceptual 
architecture limits the actual use of DSSs, because most 
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physicians, especially expert and skilled ones often rely 
on, intuitive thinking, their “clinical-eye”.
However, others have pointed out the valuable role 
of intuition in making good medical decisions [9, 10]. For 
instance, Gabbay and Le May [11], described how expert 
physicians develop strategies based on the use of subtle 
clues to quickly infer important judgments without a 
complete information base. They called these strategies 
“mindlines” as opposed to guidelines.
In previous works [12, 13], we have defined a cognitive 
balanced model (CBM) to describe how clinical decisions 
should emerge from a functional balance between analy-
sis and intuition, guidelines and mindlines. The CBM 
underlines the need for a doctor to develop both intuitive 
and analytical skills, and the potential benefit of using a 
decision support system that enables physicians to find 
the balance needed case by case, adapting the thinking 
style to fit the actual demands of the problem. Medical 
practitioners must learn to trust their intuition, but also 
know how to prevent heuristic-related fatal biases.
Fuzzy cognitive maps
The need to accommodate this dynamic balance and the 
natural presence of uncertainty in most clinical settings 
requires a decision support resource capable of handling 
this complexity, such as one based on fuzzy cognitive 
maps (FCM) [14].
To build a FCM, doctors are not required to quantify the 
importance of contributing information, they only need an 
intuitive comprehension of a clinical scenario, and the rel-
evant factors that need to be considered. As shown in differ-
ent experimental studies, FCM can improve the diagnostic 
process by incorporating a cognitive balanced decision [15, 
16]. The great advantage of this approach is that it provides 
the possibility to incorporate heuristics and intuitive knowl-
edge in a defined conceptual scheme [17]. This includes 
both analytical (S2) and synthetic components (S1), often 
described as divergent concepts in a decision process but 
perfectly integrated in the FCM balanced model.
A formal model for clinical settings
As described before, a FCM is a graph modeling a dynamic, 
complex system, consisting of nodes (Ci) and interconnec-
tion (eij) between concepts, expressing cause and effect 
relations between them.
The general formula expressing the value of each 
concept Ci is the following, in which the value of each 
concept Ci is calculated computing the influence of other 
concepts to the specific one, through the calculation rule 
given by the equation:
 ( )=≠= −∑ 1( ) ( 1)jj ini j jix t f x t w  (1)
where xi(t) is the value of the concept Ci at time t; xj(t–1) 
represents the value of the concept Cj at time t–1; wji is the 
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Figure 1 Mental model is the physician’s cognitive structure that incorporates and gives sense to the data flow coming from the environ-
ment (patients’ symptoms, clinical tests and the like).
From this mental structure both analytical and synthetic thinking may be activated in order to generate and evaluate hypotheses. We use 
the term synthetic thinking to indicate all those processes that do not require conscious data decomposition and representation. This kind 
of thinking is generally defined as intuitive or heuristic [1].
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weight of the interconnection between Cj and Ci; f repre-
sents the sigmoid function
λ−
=
+
1
1 x
f
e
The weights wji characterize the interconnections. 
They describe the degree of causality between two con-
cepts and can assume values in the interval [–1, 1]. The 
sign of a weight respectively indicates positive causality 
that is an increase in the value of the concept Ci will cause 
an increase in the value of the concept Cj, or negative cau-
sality. In this latter case the increase of the value of the 
concept Ci will cause the decrease in the value of Cj or the 
decrease of Ci will cause the increase of Cj. If the weight 
is equal to zero, there is no relationship between the 
two concepts. In summary, the strength of the weight wji 
reflects the degree of influence between concept Ci and Cj.
To model the mutual and reciprocal influence of S1 
and S2 (intuitive and analytical thinking), these relation-
ships are described by the equations 1 and 2 (1) introduc-
ing a modification of the weight wji as follows. A panel of 
experts is asked to consider all of the individual concepts, 
attributes, interconnections and relative weights, repre-
senting the graphical display of a given clinical scenario 
(a connected graph). The experts are then asked to express 
two parameters: one formulated on the basis of their 
experiences and intuitions (S1), the other deriving from 
objective data and evidence-based analysis (S2). The new 
weights w′ji in the formulas (1) and (2) will be so obtained 
by the sum of the weights indicated by the experts, namely 
S1 and S2, corresponding to the two thinking systems:
S1 S2jiw = +′
The formulas will be:
 ( )=≠= − ′∑ 1( ) ( 1)jj ini j jix t f x t w  (1b)
 
=
≠
 
= − + −′  ∑ 11 2( ) ( 1) ( 1)jj ini j ji ix t f k x t w k x t  (2b)
where w′ji = S1+S2
We chose the sum because it is the simplest calcula-
tion and it preserves the meaning of the weights in the for-
mulas, both in the regard to direction (positive or negative 
influence) and magnitude.
The different FCM resulting from the work of the 
panel of experts will be evaluated by an automatic system 
comparing the results with the expected ones. We are not 
able to predict a priori which of the two formulations will 
optimally converge, so we argue that both the presented 
FCM mathematical formulations need to be tested.
An example
To illustrate how our model works, we propose here a sim-
plified, though realistic, model of a differential diagnosis 
between psychogenic non-epileptic (PNES) and epileptic 
seizures (ES) [18]. The differentiation of the two patho-
logical conditions is often not trivial, since the symptoma-
tology of both ES and PNES is particularly variable, the 
behavioral features of PNES can simulate epileptic ones, 
and both types of seizures may occur in the same patients. 
The complexity of this problem fits our aim, because FCMs 
are particularly useful in ambiguous contexts and when 
incomplete or not completely reliable information must be 
used. Figure 2 presents a simplified model of the problem: 
Clouds indicate decision-concepts, that is the two diagno-
ses we are considering; ellipses describe the most impor-
tant factors (factor-concepts) involved in distinguishing 
the two possibilities, the input of our FCM.
The following characteristics should be considered to 
differentiate ES and PNES in ambiguous cases: Anamnes-
tic information (history of neurological and psychiatric 
disorders, in particular the presence of significant psy-
chological trauma), clinical data (the presence of brain 
pathology, a mood disorder, a neurological condition, 
EEG abnormalities, and hormonal indices, e.g., post-ictal 
serum level of prolactin), behavioral features (response 
to antiepileptic drugs and/or placebo, provocation of sei-
zures, typicality of symptoms), psychological/psychiatric 
aspects (assessment of personality) and demographic 
data (e.g., PNES is more common in women). All this 
information should be integrated to suggest a final con-
clusion [18, 19] because any single information source, 
might, almost equally, suggest either ES and PNES. Fur-
thermore, some of these data are difficult to collect, being 
not always available or reliable.
Following the simpler FCM model proposed by Geor-
gopoulos and Stylios [20] we could use the clinical data 
alone to obtain a fuzzy-based decision aid. However, we 
argue that the utility of the FCM would be strengthened 
by incorporating both analytical and intuitive input. To 
illustrate this process, we asked an expert neurologist to 
consider the differentiation of ES from PNES based on his 
expertise. The analytical and the intuitive differentiation 
model obtained are the results of two different informa-
tion sources. The former is evidence-based and it should 
be assembled by an independent expert (or panel of 
Brought to you by | Università degli Studi di Milano
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/5/15 3:36 PM
292      Lucchiari et al.: FCM in diagnostic decisions
experts) asked to consider only dedicated literature. This 
generally (but not always) implies the construction of a 
complex model where many factors and interactions are 
considered. In cases where the evidence is strong and 
clearly stated, this model should be the optimal one. The 
second differentiation model is instead expertise-based, 
and is generally simpler, since the actual experience of the 
doctor guides the weighting process. Those factors previ-
ously found to efficiently discern ES and PNES in concrete 
occurrences, despite strong scientific evidence, should 
be, for example, overweighted. 
Finally, we carried out a balanced weighting proce-
dure of each attribute, based both on literature data (S2) 
and the doctor’s expertise (S1; see Table 1). The values can 
be summed to incorporate the final weight of a simple 
syntax, we then summed the two values obtaining the 
final weight of each attribute in the FCM software. In this 
way, the ultimate output reflects both analytical and syn-
thetic considerations.
This Table is used to populate the FCM model, deter-
mining the relative importance of each of the m factor-
concepts with respect to the n possible (2 in our example) 
decision-concepts. These fuzzy weights will be trans-
lated into numerical weights by the algorithm used. For 
instance, very high corresponds to 90% of  relevance 
of a given factor and the weight assigned will  be  0.9. 
Cerebral pathology Atypical symptoms
Psychiatric
assessment
Hormonal markers
Continuous long
EEG indices
Interictal EEG
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Gender
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Figure 2 A simplified model of the ES/PNES differentiation problem.
Dashed lines indicate weak or uncertain connections. Clouds represent decision-concepts, and ellipses represent factor-concepts. Factor-
factor connections may be either positive (synergic) or negative (competitive).
Table 1 Weights attributed by the use of analytical and synthetic 
thinking to decision attributes of the FCM.
Attributes   Synthetic  
weight (S1)
  Analytical 
weight (S2)
  PNES   ES   PNES   ES
Presence of cerebral pathology   Low   Medium  Medium  High
Gender (women)   Low   Low   Medium  Low
Interictal EEG alteration   Medium  High   0   High
Long-term EEG monitoring   Low   High   0   High
Hormonal indices   Low   High   0   High
History of psychological trauma   High   Medium  High   0
Psychiatric assessment   High   Medium  High   Low
History of neurological 
diseases
  Medium  High   Low   High
Mood disturbance   High   Medium  High   Low
Bizarreness of symptoms   High   Medium  High   Low
To sum related weights we used the following simple rules (S1+S2): 
0 + any Value  =  0; Low+Low  =  Low; Low+Medium  =  Medium; 
High+Low  =  High; Very high + Low  =  Medium; Medium + Medium  =  
Medium; Medium + High  =  High; Medium+Very High  =  High; High 
+ High  =  High; Very High + Very High =  Very High. In this case, we 
decided to give equal weights to S1 and S2, but in a given situation 
different weights should be assigned. Actually, these assignments 
should be regarded as arbitrary and could be modified to fit specific 
clinical contexts and/or to the confidence a doctor has with exper-
tise-based or evidence-based models. This means that clinicians 
deciding to use this decision support tool could adapt it to his/her 
decision style by appropriate adjustments to the weighting rules.
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Consequently the FCM algorithm will work on two matri-
ces, W and X. Matrix W contains all the connection 
weights, and may include negative values if competitive 
connections between factors are present, while X contains 
the values assigned in a specific case. To place values in 
X, the decision maker will assign values to each attribute 
present in the FCM-model, using the same fuzzy degrees 
(0, low, medium, high or very high). Naturally, only data 
actually available will be placed in X, while the input-fac-
tor not available will correspond to nodes not activated (0 
values). For instance, in a specific case, a doctor could use 
the FCM decision aid using only EEG signal abnormalities, 
the history of neurological disorders and the presence of 
mood disturbance, assigning respectively High, Medium 
and Low as fuzzy degrees and 0 to all other model factors 
(in this case the model would suggest a diagnosis of ES).
Conclusions
We argue that fuzzy cognitive maps, already recognized 
and tested in the domain of medical diagnosis, have 
received inadequate attention by researchers and doctors. 
It is likely that in the near future more FCM-based deci-
sion aids will become available both during medical train-
ing and in everyday clinical practice, providing a better 
balance of analytical and synthetic mental processes with 
beneficial effects on decision making and patients’ out-
comes. The FCM approach provides a method to handle 
uncertainty in clinical decision-making when uncertainty 
is expected to be high. The fuzziness of the maps allows 
one to visualize the hazy degrees of causality between 
concepts, and their graphic structure allows easy visuali-
zation of the relationship between concepts.
Furthermore, we argue that training doctors to 
balance intuitive and analytical thinking will enable them 
to increase their cognitive awareness about how they 
reason, decide and solve problems and sensitize them the 
consequences of medical decisions, both and negative. In 
this way, doctors will strengthen their ability to learn from 
practice, developing a easily adaptable expertise, par-
ticularly useful in situations of high complexity or rapid 
evolving evidence.
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